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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

;

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

:

CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No, 870290-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

This appeal is from a conviction of Attempted Tampering
with Evidence, a Class A Misdemeanor, in vioXation of Utah Code
Ann. S 76-8-510 (1978) after a trial in the Third Judicial
District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal

under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987).

1.

Whether based upon the evidence and all reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to
the verdict, reasonable men roust have entertained a reasonable
doubt that defendant committed the offense of Attempted Tampering
with Evidence.
2.

Whether the trial court erred in finding by a

preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed between
the co-defendants prior to admitting the nqn-hearsay coconspirator statements.
3*

Whether the trial court erre4 in not compelling the

State to respond to defendant's Motion for a Bill of Particulars.

CQH5TITyTIQH^^£B5YISIQH5x-SIA3^1£5^^MD^BIJLES
Utah R. Evid. 104(a) provides:
Questions of admissibility generally.
Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be witness,
the existence of a privilege, or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined
by the court, subject to the provisions of
subdivision (b)• In making its determination
it is not bound by the rules of evidence
except those with respect to privileges.
Utah R. Evid. 801(d)2)(E) provides:
Statements which are not hearsay.
A Statement is not hearsay if

The statement is offered against a party and
is . . . a statement by a co-conspirator of
a party during the course and in the
furtherance of the conspiracy
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-4(b) (1982) provides:
An indictment or information shall charge
the offense for which the defendant is being
prosecuted by using the name given to the
offense by common law or by statute or by
stating is concise terms the definitions of
the offense sufficient to give the defendant
notice of the charge. As information may
contain or be accompanied by a statement of
facts sufficient to make out probable cause
to sustain the offense charged where
appropriate. Such things as time, place,
means, intent, manner, value and ownership
need not be alleged unless necessary to
charge the offense. Such things as money,
securities, written instruments, pictures,
statutes and judgments may be described by
any name or description by which they are
generally known or by which they may be
identified without setting forth a copy.
However, details concerning such things may
be obtained through a bill of particulars.
Neither presumptions of law not matters of
judicial notice need be stated.
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Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-4(e) (1982) provides.
When facts not set out in an information
or indictment are required to inform a
defendant of the nature and cause of the
offense charged, so as to enable him to
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a
written motion for a bill of particulars.
The motion shall be filed at arraignment or
within ten days thereafter, or at siich later
time as the court may permit. The pourt may,
on its own motion, direct the filind of a
bill of particulars. A bill of particulars
may be amended or supplemented at ahy time
subject to such conditions as justice may
require. The request for and contents of a
bill of particulars shall be limited to a
statement of factual information needed to
set forth the essential elements of the
particular offense charged.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-4-101 (1978) provides:
Attempt—Elements of offense—(1) For
purposes of this part a person is guilty of
an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with
the kind of culpability otherwise required
for the commission of the offense, he engages
in conduct constituting a substantial step
toward commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, ctonduct
does not constitute a substantial step unless
it is strongly corroborative of th^ actor's
intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of
shall arise:

attempt

(a) Because the offense attempted was
actually committed; or
(b) Due to factual or legal
impossibility if the offense could have
been committed had the attendant
circumstances been as the actor believed
them to be.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1978)provides:
Tampering with evidence—A person commits
a felony of the second degree if, believing
that an official proceeding or investigation
is pending or about to be instituted, he:

(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or
removes anything with a purpose to impair its
verity or availability in the proceeding or
investigation; or
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything
which he knows to be false with a purpose to
deceive a public servant who is or may be
engaged in a proceeding or investigation.
STATEMENT_Of_TflE_C&S£
Defendant, Claude Donald Harman, was charged by
Indictment with Criminal Conspiracy, a Third Degree Felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-4-201 (1978) , Tampering with
Evidence, a Second Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
S 76-8-510 (1978), Tampering with a Witness, a Third Degree
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-8-508 (1978), and
Official Misconduct, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. S 76-8-201 (1978).
Defendant was convicted of Attempted Tampering with
Evidence in a jury trial held February 18, 1987 through March 6,
1987, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge,
presiding.

Defendant was sentenced by Judge Uno to perform 600

hours of community service in lieu of jail, to pay a fine of
$2,500, and to remain on court supervised probation for a period
of 18 months (R. 504).

On May 1, 1983, a fire occured at the Fashion Place
Professional Plaza in Murray, Utah (R. 540 at p. 272). The
damages caused by the fire were in excess of one million dollars
including damages to the office of Dr. Joe Culbertson, a Salt
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Lake County employee in the Mental Health Department (R. 540 at
pp. 274, 286, and 359). After the fire had been extinguished, C.
Dean Larsen, Assistant Chief and Fire Marshall for the Murray
City Fire Department, reported that in his opinion the fire
originated in the office of Dr. Culbertson due to the misuse of
an extension cord and space heater (R. 540 at pp. 268, and 28586) .
The next day, Evan Stephens, the Risk Manager for Salt
Lake County, requested Bill Hyde, Chief Deputy of the Civil
Division for the Salt Lake County Attorney's| Office, to begin an
investigation into the cause and origin of the fire due to the
possible liability facing the County (R. 54(j at pp. 346, and 363;
R. 541 at p. 499). In response, a request fjor investigative
assistance was sent to defendant who was then the Chief
Investigator for the County Attorney's Office (R. 529 at pp. 116
and 126)• Defendant assigned investigators Ralph Tolman and Olin
Yearby to assist Murray City Fire Department in determining the
cause and origin of the fire (R. 532 at p. 1233).
On Monday, May 2, 1985, Tolman an£ Yearby went to the
fire scene and assisted Chief Larsen in performing a "dig-down"
in Culbertson1s office (R. 532 at p. 1233).

Larsen explained to

Tolman his theory that the space heater in Culbertson1s office
was the cause of the fire. Id.
On May 3, 1988, Tolman informed Mr. Stephens that he
concurred with Mr. Larsen1s opinion that the fire originated in
the County offices (R. 532 at p. 1236).

Concerned about the

County's liability, Mr. Stephens obtained authorization to hire
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Jim Ashby, a private fire investigator, to determine the cause
and origin of the fire (R. 541 at p. 384-85).

Mr. Stephens wrote

defendant a letter on May 5, 1983 thanking him for the
investigative assistance, explaining the County's exposure to
substantial liability, and notifying him that an outside fire
expert had been retained.

Id.

(Statefs Exhibit 12.)

Subsequently, the space heater cord was examined by an
independent laboratory which determined that the heater could not
have been the cause of the fire since it was not energized at the
time of the fire (R. 532 at p. 659). Based upon the laboratory
results and his independent investigation, Mr. Ashby filed a
cause and origin report on June 6, 1983 concluding that the fire
originated in the attic above the county offices (R. 536 at pp.
659-662) (State's Exhibit 18).
On June 21, 1983, Tolman prepared a case closure form
which was rejected by his immediate supervisor, Sam Dawson,
because it lacked a report on the fire (R. 532 at p. 124)
(State's Exhibit 22).

On August 1, 1983, Tolman submitted his

seven-page report to Mr. Dawson who refused to accept it stating
that it "parroted" Larsen's fire report, it did not state the
sources relied upon, and it made the County look bad (R. 532 at
p. 1244) (State's Exhibit 8) (Sfifi Appendix "A").

At Tolman's

insistence, Dawson passed the report on to defendant for review
(R. 532 at p. 1245).

Several days later, defendant called Tolman

into his office regarding the report.

Id*

Defendant informed

Tolman that his report was unacceptable, that it "parroted"
Larsen's report, that it made the County look bad, and ordered
him to prepare a more concise report which referred to Ashbyvs
-6-

favorable report (R. 535 at 869; R. 541 at pp. 444, 509 and 561;
R. 536 at pp. 665, 696, 702 and 748; R. 530 at pp. 14-16 and 44;
R. 532 at 1246).

Harman further ordered Tolman to shit can,

destroy, deep six, shred, get rid of, and tear up the seven page
report and submit a one-page, short report which did not identify
the origin and source of the fire (R. 530 at p. 16; R. 535 at pp.
919 and 940; R. 530 at pp. 19 and 29; R. 530 dt p. 16; R. 535 at
p. 869; R. 536 at p. 747; R. 535 at p. 924; R< 530 at p. 15).
On August 25, 1983, Tolman submitted a one-page report
excluding any opinions as to the fire origin &nd simply referring
to Ashby*s report (State's Exhibit 7) (£££ Appendix " B " ) . The
report was quickly approved, signed by defendant, and placed in
the master file thus closing the case (R. 536 at pp. 752-53)•
Prior to the rejection of the seven page report, Tolman
had given Dean Larsen a courtesy copy of the report as a matter
of inter-agency cooperation (R. 532 at pp. 1255-56).

After the

report was rejected by defendant, Tolman telephoned Larsen and
told him that defendant wanted the report destroyed because it
could cost the County millions (R. 535 at 91^). Tolman asked
Larsen to get rid of the report.

Id*

In November, 1985, Larsen revealed the existence of the
seven-page report during a civil deposition inquiring into the
cause of the fire (R. 535 at pp. 932 and 938). Larsen testified
at the deposition that defendant had ordered Tolman to destroy
the report (R. 535 at p. 940). Soon after, the media reported
that a cover-up existed in the County Attorney's Office regarding
the investigative fire report (R. 530 at p. 9 ) •
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In 1986, a Salt Lake County Grand Jury was called to
investigate possible criminal charges related to the alleged
cover-up of reports regarding the Fashion Place Professional
Plaza fire (R. 537 at p. 1020).

The Grand Jury subsequently

indicted defendant and Tolman for Criminal Conspiracy, Tampering
with a Witness, Tampering with Evidence, and Official Misconduct
(R. 206). After a jury trial held February 18, 1987 through
March 6, 1987, defendant was convicted of Attempted Tampering
with Evidence (R. 505).
£U!$MMX_QF_MGUMENT

Sufficient evidence was adduced at trial to support the
jury's finding that defendant committed the offense of Tampering
with Evidence.

It was the exclusive prerogative of the jury to

weigh the evidence and the jury could have found defendant
committed the offense despite any evidence to the contrary.
The trial court properly found by a preponderance of
the evidence that a conspiracy existed and that defendant was a
party to that conspiracy thus admitting the co-conspirator's
statements pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).

The trial

court was not required to make a pre-trial determination of the
admissibility of the co-conspirator's statements nor was it
required to restate the reasoning and evidence relied upon in
making its determination.
Because defendant failed to pursue his Motion for a
Bill of Particulars, the trial court did not err in failing to
compel the prosecution to respond.

Defendant's motion was

improper in that it sought to obtain a review of the evidence and
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limit the State's alternative avenues of proqf.

In any event,

defendant was not prejudiced by the State*s failure to respond
since the Indictment was sufficient, defendant had copies of all
relevant grand jury testimony, and defendant had access to the
prosecutor's files.

EQIUX-I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THE
OFFENSE OF ATTEMPTED TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE.
On appeal, defendant argues that there was insufficient
evidence presented at trial to support his conviction.

A review

of the evidence, however, reveals that defendant's claim is
without merit.
The Utah Supreme Court pointed out in Siaie_YjL_B2fij££x,
709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), that where a defendant claims the
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, the standard
of review is narrow.
"tW]e review the evidence and dll
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from
it in the light most favorable to the verdict
of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction
for insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted." JSiflifi
Xx_££Jti:££f Utah, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983);
aSCfitdfiiflifi-.Xx«8JcCfli:dfillrUtah, $52 P.2d
942, 945 (1982). In reviewing the
conviction, we do not substitute our judgment
for that of the jury. "It is the exclusive
function of the jury to weigh the evidence
and to determine the credibility Of the
witnesses. . . . " SJfcflJ;s_XjL_L£miD, Utah, 606
P.2d 229, 231 (1980);flCCfltd£Jtai£_JU_.LiJld£I)r
Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1983). So long as
there is some evidence, including reasonable
inferences, from which findings of all the
requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. • . •
T*_ *<- ^4* fenmhasis in original).

Defendant was convicted of Attempted Tampering with
Evidence*

An Attempt is defined as follows:
Attempt—Elements of offense—(1) For
purposes of this part a person is guilty of
an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with
the kind of culpability otherwise required
for the commission of the offense, he engages
in conduct constituting a substantial step
toward commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct
does not constitute a substantial step unless
it is strongly corroborative of the actor's
intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt
shall arise:
(a) Because the offense attempted was
actually committed? or
(b) Due to factual or legal
impossibility if the offense could have
been committed had the attendant
circumstances been as the actor believed
them to be.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-4-101 (1978).

The criminal code further

defines Tampering with Evidence as follows:
Tampering with evidence—A person commits
a felony of the second degree if, believing
that an official proceeding or investigation
is pending or about to be instituted, he:
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or
removes anything with a purpose to impair its
verity or availability in the proceeding or
investigation; or
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything
which he knows to be false with a purpose to
deceive a public servant who is or may be
engaged in a proceeding or investigation.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510 (1978)•
Thus, the elements of Attempted Tampering with Evidence
are that a person (1) believe that an official proceeding or

investigation is pending or about to be instituted, and (2)
engage in conduct constituting a substantial step toward
altering, destroying, concealing, or removing Anything with a
purpose to impair its verity or availability ib the proceeding or
investigation.
A review of the voluminous evidence reveals that sworn
testimony and evidence was offered to establish each and every
element of the offense.

Defendant himself testified that he

assigned Ralph Tolman and Olin Yearby to conduct an official
investigation into the cause and origin of the Fashion Place
Professional Plaza fire (R. 529 at pp. 125-27) (State's Exhibit
11.)

In response, Tolman prepared a seven-page report setting

forth the investigative action taken, the information obtained,
and the suspected origin of the fire (R. 532 at p. 1242) (State's
Exhibit 8.)

Tolman submitted the report to defendant for

approval and gave a courtesy copy to Murray City Fire Marshall,
Dean Larsen (R. 529 at p. 137; R. 532 at p. 1254).

After

reviewing the report, defendant called Tolman into his office and
ordered Tolman to write a substitute report (R. 529 at pp. 14647).
At trial and before the Grand Jury, Tolman testified
that defendant did not like the first report because it made the
County "look bad" and "liable" (R. 530 at p. 44; R. 532 at 1246).
Defendant instead wanted a more concise report which simply
referred to Ashby's favorable report (R. 532 at p. 1246).
Wendell Coombs, Murray City Fire Chief, testified that Tolman had
told him that defendant did not like the report because it made
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the County "look bad" (R. 535 at p. 869). Joan Binkerd, a
secretary in the County Attorney's Investigative Division,
overheard defendant tell Tolman that the report made the County
•look bad" and "liable" (R. 536 at p. 696). Sam Dawson, the
Assistant Chief Investigator in the County Attorney's Office, was
present when defendant told Tolman to write a substitute "short,
one-page" report which referred to Ashby's report (R. 536 at p.
747).
Additionally, Dean Larsen, the Murray City Fire
Marshall, testified that Tolman called him soon after defendant
rejected the report and told Larsen that defendant was concerned
that the report could cost the County millions and that defendant
ordered the report to be destroyed (R. 535 at pp. 919 and 940).
Larsen further stated that defendant wanted Tolman to write a
substitute report with no conclusion (R. 535 at p. 924).
Finally, John Harrington, a reporter for Channel Four
News, testified that he had spoken with Tolman soon after the
report was publicly released in 1985 and that Tolman explained
how defendant had ordered the report to be "shit canned," "deep
sixed," or "shredded" because it made the County look bad (R. 530
at pp. 14, 16, 19 and 29). He also stated that Tolman said
defendant wanted a substitute report with "no determination" (R.
530 at p. 15) .
Based upon the evidence adduced at trial, a jury could
reasonably conclude that defendant ordered Tolman to conceal or
destroy the report in the official fire investigation with the
purpose to impair the reports availability.
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Thus, the evidence

was sufficient to establish the requisite elements of the
offense.
Defendant further argues that the evidence was
insufficient because some evidence tends to show that defendant
did not order Tolman to destroy the report.

In making his

argument/ defendant ignores the fundamental principle that a
jury's belief or disbelief of a defendant's theory of a crime is
a matter within the jury's exclusive prerogative to weigh the
credibility of the witness testimony.

St;at5 v^ Lfrinnu 606 P.2d

229, (Utah 1980); El£Q-Vi&Llb}i±iQnj.-In£jij.-X*-E&Llini

375, 412 P.2d 615 (Utah 1966).

17 Utah 2d

The basic function of the jury is

to weigh the conflicting evidence and draw conclusions therefrom.
SiaJtfi^Y^.EifilCfi# 722 P.2d 780 (Utah 1986).

Respite testimony to

the contrary, the jury could have found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that defendant committed the offense of which he was
convicted £Jk3i£_yx_££±i££, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983).

EQIH3LU
THE COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE NON-HEARSAY
CO-CONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS PURSUANT TO RULE
801(d)(2) (E).
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in finding
that a conspiracy existed and that defendant was a party to that
conspiracy thus making admissible the non-hearsay coconspirator's statements.

Utah R. Evid. 801(d)2)(E) provides in

pertinent part as follows:
Statements which are not hearsay.
A Statement is not hearsay if
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The statement is offered against a party and
is . . . a statement by a co-conspirator of
a party during the course and in the
furtherance of the conspiracy.
The Utah Supreme Court set forth the standard to be applied to
co-conspirator's statements in jSiflJt£_X.1.-.SlLay# 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah
1986) and noted as follows:
We acknowledge the divergent authority on
the subject and hold today, in accordance
with the prevailing view, that the criminal
venture and the defendant's participation
therein must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. When applying the
standard to determine whether to admit a coconspirator's hearsay statements, the court
may consider the accused's own statements
indicating his involvement in the conspiracy,
as well as actions by the accused or the
declarant. • . •
Id. at 1319, (footnotes omitted).
In the present case, the trial court permitted the
prosecution to establish independently the criminal venture and
defendant's participation therein prior to the admission of the
co-conspirator's statements.

At the time of the ruling, the

State had established that Tolman had prepared a seven-page
report concluding that the fire originated in the County offices,
that defendant had rejected the report stating it made the County
look liable, that defendant ordered Tolman to prepare a short,
one-page report referring to Ashby's report which concludes the
fire originated elsewhere, that Tolman submitted the one-page
report as ordered deleting his investigative findings, and that
defendant approved the one-page report (R. 536 at pp. 696 and
747) (State's Exhibits 7 and 8).

Based upon the independent evidence, the trial court
found as follows:
Based on testimony that has been given so
far, the Court is of the opinion tjiat the
evidence does show that there is some, either
whether you call it cover-up or some evidence
that would indicate that there is,Ion the
part of the parties involved, an effort to
not have the report that is the subject
matter of this particular hearing not to be
divulged publicly as far as the records of
the county attorney is concerned.
(R. 535 at p. 868).
As the Utah Supreme Court stated iifi Siay, an appellate
court "will not disturb the ruling of the trial court on
questions of admissibility of evidence unless it clearly appears
that the lower court was in error."
S£a££-X±-£Ql£*

Siay* at 1316; Sss

674 P.2d 119, 122 (Utah 1983).

alSQr

The trial court

made its finding that the evidence established a cover-up by the
parties to conceal the investigative report.

Thus, the non-

hearsay co-conspirator statements were properly admitted.
Defendant further argues that the trial court erred by
failing to hold a pretrial hearing on the aditiissibility of the
co-conspirator statements pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 104(a) (R.
29-30).

Rule 104(a) provides as follows:
Questions of admissibility generally.
Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be witness,
the existence of a privilege, or the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined
by the court, subject to the provisions of
subdivision (b). In making its determination
it is not bound by the rules of evidence
except those with respect to privileges.

-15-

Utah R. Evid. 104(a).

Plainly, Rule 104(a) does not require a

PIfiJtiial determination

of admissibility, but rather, that the

determination be made preliminary
evidence.

to the admission of the

This view is in accord with the Supreme Court f s ruling

in SldX which would permit a conspiratorfs
provisionally

admitted

subject to eventual independent proof and

a finding of admissibility
jury.
U.S.

£iay at 1319.
, 97 L.Ed.2d

statements to be

before the case is submitted

to the

(S££ alss, Efiilliaily-YA«yDited^5Jtfltfifi#
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144, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (June 23, 1987); Ufliifid

S£atea-x±-lahnaani 757 F.2d i486 (4th cir. 1985); uniifid-Siai£s
XjL-YlnSflDr 606 F.2d 149 (6th C i r . 1979), fifiJLfc. dfiQifid/ 444 U.S.
1074 (1980); and UDite^SiSiefi.s^fiiDfifi,

717 F.2d 1481, 1488 (4th

C i r . 1983) i n t e r p r e t i n g the analogous Federal Rules of Evidence).
Accordingly, the t r i a l court did not e r r in f a i l i n g to hold a
p r e t r i a l hearing regarding the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of the coconspirator s t a t e m e n t s .
Defendant f i n a l l y urges t h a t the t r i a l court erred by
f a i l i n g to specify the reasoning and evidence r e l i e d upon in
making i t s finding of a d m i s s i b i l i t y .

On t h i s p o i n t , the Utah

Supreme Court in QLSZ merely required the t r i a l court to make the
finding of a d m i s s i b i l i t y on the record and npt t h a t the t r i a l
court r e s t a t e the evidence r e l i e d upon in i t s r u l i n g .
1319.

The Tenth C i r c u i t Court of Appeals concurs t h a t a t r i a l

court need not pinpoint the evidence r e l i e d upon.
Xx^CfltUfi^EiDS-EflfiJsiDg^CQ.L^inCxf

SJlLLfc£d_S.tai£.S

793 F.2d 232, 242 (10th C i r .

1986); ACCflid UDJLtfi^SJtfligfi^X^Buclifll)Jan#
1986)•

Stay a t

787 F.2d 477 (10th C i r .

As noted e a r l i e r , the prosecution had e s t a b l i s h e d
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PQIHIJJJ
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN NOT COMPELLING THE
PROSECUTION TO RESPOND TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not
compelling the prosecution to provide a Bill of Particulars
setting forth the manner in which defendant allegedly committed
the offense.

Defendant's claim lack merit.

Utah R. Crim. P. 4(b) requires that an offense be
charged as follows:
An indictment or information shall charge
the offense for which the defendant is being
prosecuted by using the name given to the
offense by common law or by statute or by
stating is concise terms the definitions of
the offense sufficient to give the defendant
notice of the charge. As information may
contain or be accompanied by a statement of
facts sufficient to make out probable cause
to sustain the offense charged where
appropriate. Such things as timef place,
means, intent, manner, value and ownership
need not be alleged unless necessary to
charge the offense. Such things as money,
securities, written instruments, pictures,
statutes and judgments may be described by
any name or description by which they are
generally known or by which they may be
identified without setting forth a copy.
However, details concerning such things may
be obtained through a bill of particulars.
Neither presumptions of law not matters of
judicial notice need be stated.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-4(b) (1982).

Additionally, Rule 4(e)

provides for a Bill of Particulars under the following
circumstances:
When facts not set out in an information
or indictment are required to inform a
defendant of the nature and cause of the
offense charged, so as to enable him to
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a
written motion for a bill of particulars.
-17-

The motion shall be filed at arraignment or
within ten days thereafter, or at such later
time as the court may permit. The court may,
on its own motion, direct the filing of a
bill of particulars. A bill of particulars
may be amended or supplemented at any time
subject to such conditions as justice may
require. The request for and contents of a
bill of particulars shall be limited to a
statement of factual information needed to
set forth the essential elements of the
particular offense charged.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-4(e) (1982).
In the present case, the offense of Tampering with
Evidence was set forth in Count II of the Indictment as follows:
That during the month of August 1983, in
Salt Lake County, believing that an official
proceeding or investigation was pending or
about to be instituted, defendants Donald
Claude Harman and Ralph Tolman did alter,
destroy, conceal, or remove Ralph Tolman1s
investigative report of August 1, 1983, with
the purpose to impair it verity or availability in an official proceeding or ivnestigation which was then pending or about to be
instituted; all in violation of Utah Code
Ann. S 76-8-510, a felony of the Second
Degree.
(R. 4).
Prior to trial, defendant filed a Motion for a Bill of
Particulars requesting that the prosecution (1) state the
specific manner in which defendant was alleged to have impaired,
altered, destroyed, concealed or removed the report and (2)
provide a description of the official proceeding or investigation
alleged to have been pending or about to be instituted as set
forth in Count II (R. 31). At the same time, defendant filed a
Request for Discovery seeking copies of all the grand jury
transcripts of witness testimony concerning the charges against
defendant (R. 27).

At a pretrial hearing on January 23, 1987, defendant
did not assert his Motion for Bill of Particulars, but instead,
stated he may later pursue his motion depending on the court's
ruling with respect to the grand jury transcripts (R. 538 at p.
24)•

Subsequently, the court ordered the prosecution to provide

to defendant the grand jury transcripts (R. 116-119).
Thereafter, defendant failed to pursue his Motion for a Bill of
Particulars.

Thus, the trial court did not deny defendant's

motion but simply did not rule due to defendant's apparent
abandonment.
Upon analysis of the substance of defendant's motion,
defendant's request was improper.

The Utah Supreme Court has

stated that the purpose of a Bill of Particulars is to provide to
the accused whatever information the prosecutipn has that may fix
the date, time, and place of the alleged offense.
BQhhinSi

709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985).

SiaJtjB-JU

However, the Court has

clearly stated that a bill of particulars need not plead matters
of evidence, nor is it to be used as a device to enable
defendants to obtain a review of the prosecution's evidence.

JLd•

at 773; Sial£_yx_MiJtc2>£jJ.# 571 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Utah 1977); SJtalfi
X±„tiQLaill£,

25 Utah 2d 51, 475 P.2d 831, 833 (1970); SU.te ¥,%

MllLtfilBf 16 Utah 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872, 875-76 (1964); Siate_Y,
iACJS, 118 Utah 128, 221 P.2d 852, 855 (1950); ££fli£_JU_jLMD£SfiH#
103 Utah 129, 134 P.2d 173, 175 (1943).
In the present case, defendant requested discovery of
the specific manner in which the prosecution intended to prove
tampering, i^fix by impairing, altering, destroying, concealing,

-1Q-

or removing the report (R. 31) .

Clearly, defendant cannot

attempt to "freeze" the State's case in advance of trial by
precluding the State from utilizing evidence that may develop at
trial.

Defendants request was not to clarify a vague element of

the crime, but rather, an effort to discover the State's evidence
and limit the Statefs alternative avenues of proof,

£se j§.ta.t£_y*

BamfiBf 736 P.2d 1059, 1063-1064 (Utah App. 1987) (Orme, J.,
dissenting); SJtaifi.^-JBflPPflSr 705 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1985).

Thus,

defendant's Motion for Bill of Particulars was improper and
cannot be grounds for error.
In any event, the State's refusal to respond to
defendant's Motion for a Bill of Particulars was harmless.

The

Utah Supreme Court has explained that an error is harmless where
there is no substantial likelihood of a different result in the
absence of the error.
(Utah 1982).

JSfifi Siaifi-Y^-fliJiClnjSflDt 655 P.2d 635, 637

As shown above, each and every element of the

offense of Tampering with Evidence was clearly and specifically
set forth in Count II of the Indictment as required by Rule 4(b)
(R. 4 ) . No further information was necessary to inform defendant
of the nature and cause of the offense charged.

Additionally,

defendant was provided copies of all grand jury transcripts
regarding the charged offense (R. 116-19).

Further, defendant

admits in his brief that prosecution offered defendant access to
the prosecution files (Brief of Appellant at 19). Thus, it
appears frivolous for defendant to claim he was denied an
opportunity to adequately prepare his defense where the

-5ft-

offense was clearly set forth in the Indictment, defendant had
copies of all relevant grand jury testimony, and defendant had
access to the prosecution's files*
QQSQhU&IQl*

Based upon the foregoing, respondent respectfully
requests this Court to affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

ay of May, 1988.

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
CSBlIFI£A2E_QE_MAI£IMz
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to Edward K. Brass, attorney for appellant, 321 South 600 East,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this Z/L~r&*2
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of May, 1988.
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Supplementary Report
Salt Lake County Attorneys Office
Criminal Division

CODE VIOLATION

ENSC A$RE*ORTE0

DATE REPORTED DATE OCCURRED

rray Fire Assist

CASE NUMBER

OUTSIDC AGENCY ft CASE NUMBER

83250
RESIDENCE PHONE

AODRESS

PLAINANT

BUSINESS PHONE

rray Fire Dept.
4TIONAL INFORMATION ft SYNOPSIS

AUGUST 1, 1983
Case:

Assist in Salt Lake County Mental Health
Fire, located at Fashion pi ace Professional
Plaza 6065 South 300 East, Murray, Utah 84107.
Date of fire:

Sunday, May 1, 1983 at 0454 hours

Murray Fire Department received the first report of
fire at 0454 hours. The first responding engine came from Station
#2, which is located on 6100 South just West of State Street. It
came up 6100 South to 3rd East and went North to the Southside of
the building.

The first staging was on the Southside of the building

and inch and a half preconnecting lines were broke out and fire
fighters entered into the 2nd floor.

The fire fighters crawled

into the building and all they could find was smoke, not alot of
super heated area.

They backed out and went downstairs, broke out

glass doors and found the same as listed above.
Fire fighters came back out and tried to find the
flames.

The building was laddered, the roof was soft and spungy.

The second engine arrived from Station #1, staged on Southside
of building.
building.

Third engine arrived and staged on the Northside of

Here was observed a lot of heavy smoke drifting North.

The wind was from the South traveling 6 to 9 miles per hour on that

Page 2
Case 83250

particular morning.

The majority of smoke was omitting from the

eaves on the structure, directly above DR. JOEL COLBERTSON'S
office, East of the West entrance of the building on the Northside.
This is the primary entrance Into the 2nd floor of the Salt Lake
Mental Health area.
At this point, a fourth alarm was called in, and
Midvale Fire Department arrived.

They attacked the fire from the

Westside of the building, adjacent to 300 East. The fire had broke>
through and was coming out the Westside area by the time of arrival
of Midvale Fire Department.

At approximately this same time, entrance

was made by Murray Fire fighters into the West door on the North side,
which makes entry directly into the Salt Lake County Mental Health
area.

Fire fighter SHANE STRATEN, knocked out a door and entry was

made into the hallway.

STRATEN could feel heat and see fire to his

immediate left as he faced South.

This is the hallway that runs

inbetween DR. JOEL COLBERTSON'S office and EDITH JAVENS office.
Heat was too Intense at this point, and fire fighter STRATEN retreated
from the building.

Also, the roof was getting very spongy which

created danger to fire fighers to be inside, and fire fighters that
had been on the roof were also advised to retreat off the roof.
The first water into the building on the Northside by
Murray Fire, went through the window of DR. JOEL COLBERTSONfS office.
Then as the roof collapsed, water was put over the walls into the
main-stay area of the fire. This was the area of DR. JOEL COLBERTSON'S
office, running directly South of EDITH JAVENS and DONNA LARSEN'S
office. (See hand drawn diagram attached to report. This was the center
of area of fire.)

Page 3
Case 83250
The roof collapsed and copious amounts of water
was poured into the center of fire.

It was determined at this

point, that this particular area was totally damaged and not
recoverable and/or saveable.

Firefighters then moved their

primary effort to East and West areas of the building, to try
and contain and save remainder.

As fire fighting efforts were

directed towards the East and West end of the building, the area
directly South and West of DONNA LARSEN'S office, which belongs
to a DR. SMITH, Dentist, a Nitro/dioxyide container approximately
10 inches in diameter and 4 feet high, exited the building straight
up in the air, approximately two or three hundred feet, landing
North of the building in the parking lot approximately 300 feet
from the building.

In the same proximity of DR. SMITH'S office,

where the Nitro/dioxyide was located, were two containers of pure
oxygen of the same dimensions, which created massive additional
fire load.

This is a primary reason for additional extensive

damages in this particular area.
The false ceiling directly abov^ EDITH JAVEN'S office
area, are the roof joists running East and W^st through the length
of the building, adjacent to these joists were the ridged conduit
electrical lines and natural gas pipe lines. When the roof collapsed
and the air conditioning unit, which was on the roof, (dimensions
approximately 4 x 6 x 4

feet) fell through the roof into EDITH

JAVEN'S office. The natural gas lines were fractured and broken
and bent down into the area, adding to fire load to this particular
area.

Unknown when natural gas to the entire building was shut off.
Shortly after the central roof collapsed, this area was
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and unhampered for approximately one (1) hour, while fire fighting
efforts were directed towards the East and West ends of the
building.
On May 2f 1983 the day following the fire, this
Investigator and SGT. OLIN YEARBY, from the County Attorney's
Office, arrived to assist Assistant Fire Chief, Fire Marshall DEAN
LARSON, in ascertaining the cause of the fire.

Our attention was

directed towards a space heater and extention cord in MR. JOEL
COLBERTSON'S office.
The following is a list of items sent to A.I.D.
CONSULTING ENGINEERING INCORPORATED, 10830 Composit Drive, Dallas
Texas 75220. Area code 214 350-8781.

These items were sent for

expert examination by a J.L. GILMORE, employed by the above firm, to
ascertain if space heater was the cause of fire.

The following

items were sent:
1. A non-fire damaged electric space heater, the same
brand and type as damaged.
2.

Fire damaged space heater.

3.

Small burned electrical extention cord.

4.

Electrical receptical.

5.

2nd piece of small electrical parallel lamp cord,

apparently either serving as a lamp or some unknown appliance.
The above items were sent on May 17, 1983 by myself and
Chief DEAN LARSON.
MR. J.L. GILMOREfS conclusion was as follows:
"Based on our examination, we have found no related
evidence that would indicate the existance of an electrical fault
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submitted.

Further, we have found no evidende that would support the

cont ei"it I on t"haI !„he e 1 ec11 i cp 1[
electrically energized at f lit

ht>

a ( er , c 1 c»ck radio or "1 amp was

ime of the fire.

The small

extention cord allegedly supplying a electridal power to a lamp,
space heater ancil c 1 ock r adi o( is bei ng use • ci in ei ivIroninent somc: •
25 to 307. beyond it's rated capacity.

This qould lead to an over

temperature condition resulting damage to th^ installation and
ultimately a fire.

However, microscopic examination of t he stranded

conductors, reveals no evidence that this extention cord was
e 1 e c 11" i c a 11 y e r \ e r g i z e d a t t: I :t e 1 1 IT c o f t h e £ i re. *'
This Agent was removed from the investigation of the
fire approximately one week after being assigned

Consequently

in :i ext: ens I vc • an d fi i"1 1 I i ives 11 gat i on was nevei: consumat e d by this
Agent

This Agent's conclusions after approximately 5 days and

several on-scene walk throughs, and dig down of the area, of
DR

JOEL COLBERTSON'S off I ce are as follows:
The fire originated in the area of JOEL COLBERTSON'S

office.

Particularly the Southwest corner.

Reasons: # 1 .

The

intensive low heat (floor level) on brick wall and I pattern on
brick wall, goes directly down to area of metal file cabinet,
approximate 1 ) "1 3 inches squai e

Also the V pattern on the file

cabinet, directs it to the floor area

#2

The desk which was located

on the Northwest corner against the wall, was totally consumed.
o n l y r e c o g n i / P !4ti> 1 fj H ' m a i n d e r bt'lnft a p p r o x i m a t e l y
of the bottom of the legs of the desk.

The

1 t,n ] 1 J t n r h e *

M y conception is that the fire

originated in Southwest corner, crept up w a l l , consumed the bookcase
above the metal file cabinet, fell down into this area arid conti iiiieci
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climbing the Wi si wall to obtain the air to the Eastf where the
entry door was located and opened,

Along. Wes^ wall fi re coi itini led

up and East, adjacent to this West wall was a hide-a-way bed.
springs were totally annealed on I he couch.

The

All items on West

end of office were totally consumed and eventually the fire climbing
the wall, burning the metal grids holding the tile roof covering the
false ceiling

Thi s area becoming super "heated, to tl le poi nt where

metal structures failed,, ti les fel 1 as one piece to the £1 oor area.
Consequent! y, the carpet not destroyed until you get into the door
J

entry area

* :*;* rating on the tile is one "hoi n whei I c: lipped,

on undipped tile tr

:;-t

stays hooki rij

-

rating would be leps.
ure.

this particular structure

Clipping meaning,

They Were not in place in

* * re burned ijito the false ceiling area

and rapidly spread throughout the building.

It appears that fire

drafts were not constant and in continual 1ty with walls in false
ceiling area, allowing fire to virtually move at will to where it
could find air and fuel load.
The area that was EIHXH JAVEN'S and DONNA LARSON'S
office space, was somewhat more burned than JOEL COLBERTSON'S office.
are:

The fire was alloWed to burn freely for at

least one hour in JAVENS & LARSON'S and DR. SMITH'S ai ea

JOEL

C0LBERTS0N f S office was almost as badly burned, but as stated before,
the £ ix st watei into building wen

-

,n J U L L COLBERTSON'S window and

had to have had a hampering affect, slowing burning down here.
Consequently, this Agent feels that DR. COLBERTSON'S office may have
been virtually burned iinii prior i o waie? nnti'Mng, and/or fire
departments arrival.

The V pattern on entirf building structure
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COLBERTSON'S office sustained substantial heatt for a 1axget
period of time.

The only place the fire actually broke through the

eaves themselves, wa» where UK, COLBERTSON'S Office West wall
adjoins to the outside North wall of structure.
This Agent consequently places the origin in the
Southwest corner, JOEL COLBERTSON' S office

cai lse unknown.

Attached to report are the Murray City Fire Department
jnr i dpnf r^portK.

APPENDIX B

Supplementary Report
Salt Lake County Attorneys Office
Criminal Division

FENSE AS REPORTED

CODE VIOLATION

DATE REPORTED OATE OCCURRED

CASE NUMBER

OUTSIDE AGENCY ft CASE NUMBER

83250

Fire
MFLAINANT

ADORESS

RESIDENCE PHONE

BUSINESS PHONE

IDITIONAL INFORMATION ft SYNOPSIS

AUGUST 25, 1983
Case-

Assist in Sail; la>e County Mental Health Fire
Fashion Place Professional Plaza
6065 South 300 East, Murray, Utah

Date of firei

8410 7

Sunday, Hay 1 ] 933 at 0452 hours.

***********************************

A A A

This Investigator arrived in assist Mwrrav hire on
Monday, May
BR

963 I assisted in the process of digging thru

COI Y • :

of:*. •

v

*

On May 4th, r outside Investigator was hired by
Salt Lake County

It was at this time that II was removed from

the case to prevent duplication of invesftgative efforts.
No further action.

IjB^^^™"
irfAjfrkrftiaitfATmR l
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